Using Europe: Territorial Party Strategies in a Multi-Level System by Eve Hepburn

Author:Eve Hepburn [Hepburn, Eve]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: European, Political Parties, Political Science, Political Process, World, General
ISBN: 9780719081385
Google: b2W5DwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 9540121
Publisher: Manchester University Press
Published: 2010-10-15T00:00:00+00:00

Contrasting autonomy and policy goals

As Scharpf (2005: 8) maintains, the affirmation of the virtues of competitive over cooperative federalism ‘can be seen as a response to the challenges of European economic integration which had the effect of opening national markets to competitors from all member states’. What is important to substate parties is not just the attainment of symbolic constitutional goals, but the need to protect, or expand, the capacity of the region to control social and economic policy, to advance territorial interests, to diverge from the centre to reflect political traditions and to become more competitive in European and global markets. The trade-off for the CSU is not between autonomy and ‘influence at the centre’ (which Bavaria has in the Bundesrat) but is considered in terms of autonomy versus protection by the centre. In other words, the CSU needs to strengthen the German state, and its influence over European policy within it, in order to protect the Länder competences. But this empowerment of the German state should not come at the sacrifice of the region’s ability to exercise control over, and diverge in, policies. Herein lies the CSU’s dilemma. Alternatively, the FDP and SPD are less concerned with Europe taking responsibility for a larger area of policies from the state, due to their commitment to a European Bundesstaat. But whilst the Social Democrats wish to see the creation of a cooperative federal Europe, the Liberals endorse the model of competitive, decentralised federalism. Thus, for the political left, the trade-off involves deciding between enhanced regional autonomy versus loyalty to the centre to provide fiscal redistribution, whilst for the Liberals the question is how far regions should be able to diverge without undermining the basis of European political integration.

The Bavarian case has shown that support for cooperative and competitive federalism cuts across constitutional demands to create a federal or confederal Europe. This counters the assumption in much of the literature that competitive federalism correlates with decentralisation of legislative competences, and cooperative federalism with centralisation. As we have seen, the Greens and the FDP in particular have had difficulties in combining their ideological or capacity-related aims with their constitutional demands. The Greens take the position of favouring decentralisation of political structures and legislative competences in Europe, like the CSU, but insist that there should be limits to this to protect social cohesion and equal opportunities, and to avoid a ‘race to the bottom’, like the Social Democrats. In contrast, the FDP supports the creation of a European Bundesstaat, but endorses the model of competitive federalism that sets regions against each other and allows for policy divergence. The party most consistent in its constitutional and capacity goals is the CSU, which demands more legislative autonomy for Bavaria in a competitive federal European context. The SPD also (more-or-less) consistently argues in favour of joint decision-making and the harmonisation of economic and social policy, in order to guarantee minimum social standards and avoid widening the economic gap between East and West. It believes that Bavaria

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